City University of New York (CUNY)

CUNY Academic Works
Dissertations and Theses

City College of New York

2014

The Effectiveness of the International Criminal Court and the
Impact of the Initiating Entities
Magret Chingono
CUNY City College

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cc_etds_theses/287
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu
This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY).
Contact: AcademicWorks@cuny.edu

THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
AND
THE IMPACT OF THE INITIATING ENTITIES

MAGRET CHINGONO

14 AUGUST, 2014

Master's Thesis
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of
International Relations at the City College of New York

DR. JEAN KRASNO

1

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page Number

Table of Contents……………………………………………………………1
Abstract…………………………………………………………….. ……….2
Chapter 1 – Introduction…………………………………………………… .3
Chapter 2 – Review of Literature………………………………………….. 10
Chapter 3 – Definition of Effectiveness…………………………………….16
Chapter 4 – General Cases…………………………………………………..22
Chapter 5 – The Republic of Kenya…………………………….................. 37
Chapter 6 – Democratic Republic of Congo……………………………..… 50
Chapter 7 - The Republic of Sudan…………………………………………59
Chapter 8 - Conclusion…………………………………………………….67
Bibliography…………………………………………………………………71

1

Abstract

This thesis studies the effectiveness of the International Criminal Court (ICC) by
examining three variables namely the State parties, the Security Council and the
Prosecutor of the ICC that were given powers by the Rome Statute to initiate cases. The
hypothesis of this study is that although the ICC was created as a politically independent
judicial institution to prosecute the most serious international crimes of genocide, war
crimes and crimes against humanity, the Court's effectiveness is largely dependent on the
entity that initiates the case. By reviewing cases that were initiated and referred to the
Court since 2002 when the Statute came into force, this thesis identifies the initiator who
is most crucial in rendering the ICC effective. Examining Court proceedings and the
outcome of a case will help demonstrate the level of professionalism in handling cases by
the Court. However, cooperation with the ICC by the Parties to the Rome Statute
demonstrates that some entities are more influential in rendering the Court effective. This
means that the higher the cooperation, for example in arresting the perpetrators, providing
witnesses and evidence, the more effective the Court becomes.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The International Criminal Court (ICC), which is commonly referred to as the
Court, is a Court that was established in 2002 under the terms of the Rome Statute of
1998.1 The Court is well staffed with eighteen judges, a prosecutor and a branch known
as the registry. However, the existence of the Court is not in itself a guarantee that gross
human rights violations will come to an end. There is therefore need for sustained
cooperation between the Court and the entities that initiate cases if human rights
violations are to be contained and if the effectiveness of the Court is to be achieved. Just
as Ian Hurd rightly pointed out, the creation of the ICC was an idea that was established
following the principles of the Nuremberg Tribunals of 1946 to end impunity.2
Therefore, all parties concerned should work towards accomplishing this purpose. Thus,
the appointment of three initiating entities: namely the states parties, the Security Council
and the Prosecutor of the ICC were seen to be the best way to be able to promote and
support the goals of the Court. Besides complementing each other, these entities would

1
2

Ian Hurd, International Organizations: Politics, Law, Practice (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2011), 217.
Ibid., 217
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also act as a check on each other to make sure that none of them would dominate the
goodwill of the Court.

This thesis therefore aims to examine the influence that the initiating entities have
on the effectiveness of the Court. This will be accomplished by reviewing cases that
were referred to the Court since 2002. For each case, the initiator will be identified and
the case outcome will help us to establish the entity that is most influential in rendering
the Court effective. The thesis will be organized as follows: Chapter I introduce the
Rome Statute and the relevant articles that empower initiators of cases namely; state
party, the Security Council and the Prosecutor of the ICC.

Chapter II explores the

literature review. The scholars that have been selected share their views on the functions
of the Court and its relationship with the initiators of cases vis-à-vis the demands of the
Rome Statute. The investigation of cases, arrests and the trial processes are captured in
Chapter III. These processes are critical to note because they help in the interpretation of
effectiveness. Chapter IV outlines the general cases that were referred to the Court. For
each case, the initiator will be identified. The cases include; Libya, Sudan on Darfur, the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Cote d'Ivoire, Uganda and Kenya.

Chapters V to VII review three cases in detail. These cases are Darfur/Sudan, the
DRC and Kenya. The cases have been carefully selected because of their uniqueness.
While each case is referred by a different initiator, the cases are all unparalleled in the
history of the Court. Sudan and the case of Omar Al Bashir is examined in Chapter V.
The Al Bashir case is a Security Council referral which is unique in that it is the first time
in the history of the Court that a sitting Head of State has been issued with an arrest
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warrant. The DRC and the Lubanga case is explored in Chapter VI. The Lubanga case is
a state referral which is historic in that although it is the second case to be tried by the
Court after President Museveni's referral of the situation in Uganda in 2003, Lubanga is
the first person to be convicted by the Court.3 Chapter VII discusses Kenya and the
indictment of Uhuru Kenyata, a case that was initiated by the Prosecutor of the Security
Council. The examination of these cases will help to show the extent of the relationship
that exists between the Court and the initiating entities while the outcome of each case
will help to reveal the entity that is most influential in rendering the Court effective.

The Rome Statute and the Initiating Entities

In order to help put a stop to gross human rights violations, the Rome Statute
provided relevant Articles that contain legal clauses that serve as a guideline on the
functions of the Court and it also allowed referrals to be triggered by three entities which
are states parties, the Security Council and the Prosecutor of the ICC. These entities are
crucial in rendering the Court effective in ending gross human rights violations.
Examples of gross human rights violations include the genocide that took place in
Rwanda and the mass killings that took place in the former Yugoslavia. Yet, in order for
the ICC to have jurisdiction over the accused person, the Court must be guided by certain
articles of the Rome Statute which are; 1) Article 5 which states that the Court can have
jurisdiction over an individual only if the person is suspected of committing genocide,
war crimes and crimes against humanity, 2) the crime must have been committed on the
territory of a state party or the accused must be a citizen of a state party (Article 12(2))

3

Jennifer Fallagant, “The Prosecution of Sudanese President Al Bashir: Why an SC deferral would harm
the legitimacy of the ICC,” Wisconsin International Law Journal 27 (2010): 727-756.
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and, 3) the courts of the domestic jurisdiction must have failed to genuinely investigate or
prosecute the matter.4 While item 2 and 3 appear to be giving too much power to states
parties, a Security Council referral does not have any boundaries, in that the Council can
refer a case to the ICC where the crime took place in a non-state party (i.e., Sudan).

Overview of the Rome Statute and States Parties

Article 14 (b) of the Rome Statute empowers States Parties to refer cases to the
ICC. While Article 86 require states to cooperate fully with the Court in its investigation
and prosecution of crimes that are within the jurisdiction of the Court, it does not
necessarily follow that states will always do so. States usually refuse to cooperate with
the Court due to the following reasons, a) when a state receives competing requests for
the extradition of a suspect, b) when a cooperation request is prohibited by the State‟s
national law, c) when there are concerns that the suspects‟ human rights will be violated
once they are arrested and surrendered to the Court and finally for sovereignty claims.5
While paragraph 10 of the Statute‟s Preamble provides that the jurisdiction of the
ICC is complementary to national criminal jurisdiction, the complementarity principle
can also serve as a source of conflict. While the complementarity principle requires the
Court to defer a case in order to allow the state with jurisdiction to investigate and
prosecute a case, the principle becomes an issue when the Court's jurisdiction has been

4
5

Rome Statute, Article 5
Rita Mutyaba, “An Analysis of the Cooperation Regime of the International Criminal Court and its
Effectiveness in the Court‟s Objective in Securing Suspects in its Ongoing Investigations and
Prosecutions,” International Criminal Law Review (2012): 937-962.
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triggered.6

This has been the case with Libya. In 2011, the Security Council referred

the case of Libya to the Court pursuant to Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute and within a
few months the SC adopted Resolution 1973 which created the basis for military
intervention in Libya.7 However, the impasse between the Security Council and Libya
concerns failure by Libya to surrender Saif al-Islam to The Hague. On May 1, 2014, the
ICC prosecutor, in a filing to the court‟s judges, noted that Libya intended to proceed
with its domestic prosecution of Gaddafi, despite its continuing obligation to hand him
over to the ICC.8 While the Court may invoke Article 87 of the ICC treaty which permits
the Court to issue a finding of non-cooperation, Libya may argue on sovereignty grounds
while pointing out the right the state has to try Saif under the Libyan law as given by the
principle of complementarity. State referrals include the cases on the DRC and Uganda.

Overview of the Rome Statute and the Prosecutor
The establishment of the office of an Independent Prosecutor in the Statute
provides an avenue for individuals and marginalized groups to pursue formal
international justice. The ICC Prosecutor‟s proprio motu actions, is given powers in
accordance with Article 5 of the Statute, to initiate cases. Even though the Prosecutor
must act independently, certain guidelines of the Rome Statute must be followed. The
procedure is that, when a situation is referred to the ICC, it must clear procedural hurdles

6
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Harry Orr Hobbs, "The Security Council and the Complementary Regime of the International Criminal
Court: Eyes on the ICC,” Academic Search Complete (2012): 27.
Ibid., 27
Richard Dicker, “Final ICC Ruling on Gaddafi,” Human Right Watch, May 2014.
http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/21/libya-final-icc-ruling-gaddafi.
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to enable active investigation.9 It is only after this procedure that the Prosecutor will act
independently to investigate individuals who are suspected perpetrators of the atrocity
crimes at issue. Thereafter, the Prosecutor is required to seek judicial approval of arrest
warrants against particular persons bearing in mind that the ICC is not a court of
universal jurisdiction that can prosecute anyone who has committed an atrocity crime
anywhere in the world.10 This means that certain preconditions apply to personal
jurisdiction. For instance, the Statute requires that the individual who is charged with
atrocity crimes must be a national of a State Party to the ICC, or the territory on which
the crime was committed must belong to a State Party to the ICC.11 The Prosecutor
initiated the Kenyan case.
The Prosecutor's dual functions of initiator and prosecutor raises questions of
jeopardizing ongoing peacemaking efforts particularly in light of Article 53 which other
scholars interpret to mean that the Prosecutor should be exclusively preoccupied with the
enforcement of laws.12 However, regardless of these concerns of the Prosecutor's
functions, there are no jurisdictional boundaries when it comes to Security Council
referrals.

Overview of the Rome Statute and the Security Council

The Security Council was created under Article 23 of the United Nations Charter
and its sole responsibility is to maintain international peace and security. While the
9
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David Scheffer and Ashley Cox, “The Constitutionality of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court,” Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology Academic Search Complete (2008): 9831068.
Ibid., 986
Ibid., 987
Robert H. Mnookin, “Rethinking the Tension between Peace and Justice: The International Criminal
Prosecutor as Diplomat.” Harvard Negotiation Law Review 18 (2013): 145-174.
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Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and Rome Statute was
given the power to refer cases to the ICC, the Court's major objective is to bring
perpetrators of international crimes to justice. What we do deduce from these two
entities is that they seem to have the same goals in common; that of maintaining
international peace and security, obtaining justice for victims of egregious crimes and
that of ending impunity.13 While Article 16 of the Rome Statute allows for the promotion
of peace and security, some scholars argue that bargaining for peace tends to spell a
backward step for international criminal justice. This argument is in line with the action
that was taken by the Security Council in 2012. The Security Council invoked Article 10
and requested the ICC not to commence a case against any personnel in a UNpeacekeeping operation from a non-party state for a twelve month renewable period
beginning July 2012.14 The Security Council, by virtue of its power to invoke Articles
16 and 10, is viewed by some critics as an entity which is counterproductive in advancing
the work of the Court. The Security Council referred Sudan and Libya to the Court.

13
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Jennifer Fallagant, “The Prosecution of Sudanese President Al Bashir: Why an SC deferral would harm
the legitimacy of the ICC.” Wisconsin International Law Journal 27 (2010): 727-756
Ibid., 735
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

Scholars views on State referrals
While state referrals appear to be less problematic with Court cooperation, some
critics point to the existence of loopholes which are likely to impact negatively on the
effectiveness of the Court. For example, El Zeidy in his article, “The Ugandan
Government Triggers the First Test of the Complementary Principle,” raises questions
regarding the Ugandan self-referral on war crimes that were committed by the Lord
Resistance Army (LRA).15 While cooperation between Uganda and Court on the LRA
issue is strong, Mohamed questions the time when the LRA committed the alleged crimes
in Uganda which he argues does not tally with the limitations imposed by Article 11(1) of
the Statute. The Rome Statute requires that only cases that were committed from 2002
when the Statute came into force could be tried by the Court. The other issue that Zeidy
points out is that because Uganda represents both the territorial state and the state of
nationality, issues of complementarity and waiver will further complicate the case
because these issues are not conclusively addressed in the Statute or in the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence.16 Although the Prosecutor has the final decision on the issue of
the waiver, to either initiate an investigation or not to pursue with an investigation, these
complications tend to affect the effectiveness of the Court.

15

16

Mohamed M. El Zeidy, “The Ugandan Government Triggers The First Test Of The Complementarity
Principle: An Assessment Of The First State's Party Referral To The ICC." International Criminal Law
Review 5.1 (2005): 83-119
Ibid., 86
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2.1.3

David Krivanek's article, “Prospects for Ratification and Implementation of the

Rome Statute by the Czech Republic” claims that the Czech Republic has been the only
EU member state that had not ratified the Rome Statute.17 The reason for non ratification
is more to do with political rather than the legal aspect of the Czech constitution. The
status of the Rome Statute is determined by Articles 10 & 10a of the Czech Constitution
and the incorporation process requires the approval by parliament and ratification by the
Czech President.18

This shows that the ICC is not above any constitution. The Czech

example also shows how political pressures obtaining in a country may override and limit
the needs of the international community.

For example, Section 19 of the Czech

Constitution provides that the Republic can exercise universal jurisdiction over genocide
and war crimes but not all crimes that are listed in Articles 6, 7 and 8 of the Rome Statute
are contained in the Czech Criminal Code as crimes against humanity.19
Article 13 of the Rome Statute stipulates that the Prosecutor of the ICC becomes
engaged in an investigation after a referral by a state party, by the Security Council acting
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter or the Prosecutor using his proprio motu powers
under Article 15 of the Rome Statute.20 If the Prosecutor believes that there are
reasonable grounds to commence an investigation, he then requests authorization from
the Pre-Trial Chamber to initiate an investigation. However, the Czech criminal

17
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David Křivánek, "Prospects For Ratification And Implementation Of The Rome Statute By The Czech
Republic." International Criminal Law Review (2008): 161-184.
Ibid., 163
Ibid., 166
Rome Statute
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procedure obliges the prosecutor to initiate criminal proceedings once information that a
crime has been committed is available.21
The work of the ICC becomes even more difficult because it does not have
executive powers at its disposal. It must rely on cooperation of states parties to deliver
suspected persons, evidence & other information. Moreover, immunity issues further
complicate the relationship between the Court and state parties in particular non state
parties to the Statute. In order to abolish immunities provided by the Czech Constitution
for the Czech president, members of parliament & judges of the Constitutional Court,
there will be need to modify the constitution which needs three fifth of the members of
the Chamber of Deputies as well as three fifth of the members of the Senate to amend the
document.22 Although Krivanek's article discusses the implications of non ratification of
the Rome Statute by the Czech Republic, it is most likely that most states that are non
party to the Rome Statute are faced with the same dilemma.

Scholars' views on Security Council referrals
A number of scholars have researched the link between the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC) and the Court to see whether the UNSC is influential in the
effectiveness of the Court. Rosa Aloisi points out in her article titled “A Tale of Two
Institutions: The United Nations Security Council and the International Criminal Court,”
that international justice is threatened by the UNSC‟s political power of referring and
deferring situations to the Court.23 The article focuses on the two instances of referrals

21
22
23

Křivánek, 170
Ibid., 175
Rosa Aloisi, “A Tale of two Institutions: The United Nations Security Council and the International
Criminal Court.” International Criminal Law Review (2013): 147-168
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which have been approved by UNSC which are Sudan and Libya. Aloisi further asserts
that controversies regarding the UNSC‟s role as an initiator of cases emerged at the onset
as this role has been viewed as politically driven rather than being determined by the
magnitude of the crime.24 Consequently, the (UNSC) faces the problem of enforcement
on ICC non-member states as is the case with Sudan on Darfur and Libya.
Even though Chapter VII of the UN Charter empowers the UNSC to use its
political power to force states to cooperate, the body is considered passive in providing
financial, technical and administrative support to the Court.25 Aloisi's contribution to the
study is important in that it helps to strengthen the hypothesis of this thesis by pointing
out cases where the UNSC used its referral powers. We will understand the effect of the
UNSC's referrals in Chapter IV where the Sudan case is dealt with in details. Overall,
the article points to the idea that the UNSC referrals seem to be having a negative impact
on the implementation of justice by the Court.
Harry Orr Hobbs' article “The Security Council and the Complementary Regime
of the International Criminal Court” examines the legal relationship between the Security
Council and the International Criminal Court as it relates to the issue of the maintenance
of international peace and security and the issue of Libya. The issue of Libya and its
relationship with the ICC as a court with concurrent latent complementary jurisdiction
puts the relationship between the SC and the ICC in a difficult position since the Libyan

24

24

Aloisi, 148

Ibid., 158
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authorities are insisting that its two nationals Saif al-Islam and Senussi will be tried in
Libya according to Libyan law.
While Article 13b of the Rome Statute confers only complementary jurisdiction
onto the Court, the territorial state retains the primary right to investigate and prosecute
the alleged criminal acts.

Although the principle of complementarity is supposed to

provide a guideline on the relationship between the Court and the State, the Libyan
situation has the potential to damage the standing of the Court and international criminal
justice more generally because of the tug-of-war that exists between Libya and the Court.
Hobbs states that opinion is divided in that while others argue that complementarity
applies in all situations, others think that it only applies when a situation is referred to the
Court by the Security Council or where a state is unwilling or unable to investigate or
prosecute crimes. Lack of clarity on this issue might explain why the ICC has since its
inception convicted only one person; Thomas Lubanga Dyilo.
Rita Mutyaba's article titled “An Analysis of the Cooperation Regime of the
International Criminal Court and its Effectiveness in the Court's objective in Security
Suspects in its ongoing Investigations and Prosecutions,” explains that the issuing of an
arrest warrant for a sitting Head of State, President al Bashir, by the ICC is
unprecedented in the history of the ICC.26 While Presidents Slobadan Milosevic and
Charles Taylor were tried by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) respectively, they
were former heads of states at that time. Mutyaba further contends that the main bone of
contention regarding the al Bashir case is the question of boundaries of immunity. The
26

Mutyaba, 939
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Pre-Trial Chamber decided to strip al-Bashir of personal immunity while appropriate
interpretation of immunity under the Rome Statute and customary international law has
not been ironed out.27 Resolution 1593 gave the SC powers under Chapter VII to
determine that the situation in Sudan was a threat to international peace and security.
What then followed was that the SC referred the situation to the Prosecutor of the ICC
and al-Bashir case became the first Security Council referral under Article 13(b) of the
Rome Statute and the first sitting Head of State to be issued with arrest warrants.28 The
al-Bashir case has so far proved to be a challenge for the ICC and a threat to international
peace. First, Sudan is not party to the Rome Statute. Then, the regional organization to
which Sudan is a member is against arrest warrants on al-Bashir and the point that is
worth noting is that while the referral of the case to the Court was initiated by the
Security Council, al-Bashir remains a free man.
Scholars' views on Prosecutor's referrals
Hector Olasolo, in his article “The Triggering Procedure of the ICC” observes
that, the Office of the Prosecutor has been given a key ole in the Triggering Procedure
that is provided for in Articles 13, 14, 15, 18, 53(1) (3) and (4) of the Statute.29 Some
critics question the Prosecutor's powers given the office's mandate on the triggering
procedure. Olasolo further explains that the Rome Statute has given to the competent
Chambers of the Court a supervisory role to ensure that thee Office of the Prosecutor
carries out its functions within the margin of appreciation granted to it and in full respect
of the substantial and procedural legal standard set out in the Rome Statute and in the

27
28
29

Mutyaba, 939
Ibid., 943
Hector Olasolo, “The Triggering Procedure of the ICC.” International Criminal Law 5 (2005): 121146.
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Rules of Procedure and evidence. In a related article, Olasolo argues that the Prosecutor
has become the gatekeeper of the ICC by the sheer fact that it plays the primary role of
making decisions on the selection of situations of crisis subject to investigation.
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CHAPTER III
DEFINITION OF EFFECTIVENESS

The Rome Statute as a guideline to define effectiveness

In order to be able to define the effectiveness of the International Criminal Court,
we will need to examine three processes that the Court engages in order to determine the
admissibility of cases that are referred to the Prosecutor by the referral entities. The
Rome Statute provides stages that are to be followed by the Court in pursuing cases and
these include the investigation, arrest and trial processes. These stages are embedded in
the organs of the Court and they are important to look at because they will help us to
establish whether not only the correct procedures were followed by the Court but how
effective these components have been. For example, was the Court able to arrest the
person and bring them to the ICC for trial? Was the court able to collect the needed
evidence for trial? And finally, was there adequate access to witnesses to appear in Court
or give testimony for the trial? These processes will be analyzed in Chapter V, VI and
VII.

An Overview of the distinct Organs of the ICC

While the ICC has four distinct organs which are: three Trial Divisions, the Presidency,
the Office of the Prosecutor and the Registry, this section will look at the trial divisions
and the Office of the Prosecutor as they are the ones that are directly involved in the
investigation process. The three trial divisions, which are the Pre-Trial, the Trial
Chamber and the Appeals Chamber, and the Office of the Prosecutor, were created to

17

enable the Court to function effectively.30 Their functions are as follows: each Trial
Chamber conduct trials, the Appeals Chamber hears appeals and has the power to reverse
and amend a decision or sentence or arrange for a new trial before a different Trial
Chamber. The Office of the Prosecutor, after receiving a referral, decides if further
inquiry is necessary and if it is, it opens an investigation.31 What then follows is that,
upon determination that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation; the
Prosecutor will request the Pre-Trial Chamber to authorize commencement of an
investigation. The DRC case is an example of what happens when the Prosecutor
determines a case. When Joseph Kabila the President of the DRC referred all crimes
committed in the DRC within the ICC‟s jurisdiction in March 2004, the Prosecutor
subsequently opened the Court‟s investigation in June 2004 after observing that a further
inquiry was necessary.

The Rome Statute and the Investigation Requirements

Article 54 of the Rome Statute governs the scope of the ICC investigations. The
Prosecutor is required to gather all facts and evidence relevant to an assessment of
criminal responsibility under the Statute.32

Moreover, the ICC‟s proceedings involve

three different standards of proof at different stages of the proceedings; 1) for an arrest
warrant or summons to appear, article 58 requires reasonable grounds to believe that the
person has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court, 2) at the confirmation

30

31
32

Elizabeth C. Minogue, “Increasing the Effectiveness of the Security Council‟s Chapter VII Authority
in the current situations Before the International Criminal Court.” Vinderbilt Law Review, (2008): 647680
Ibid., 649
Alex Whiting, “Dynamic Investigative Practice at the International Criminal Court.” Law &
Contemporary Problems 76, (2014): 164-189
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hearing, article 61 requires that the chamber find sufficient evidence to establish
substantial grounds to believe that the person committed the crime charged and 3) at trial,
article 66 requires the prosecution to prove that the accused committed the crimes beyond
reasonable doubt while article 64 requires the trial chamber to provide for disclosure of
documents or information not previously disclosed in advance of the commencement of
the trial to enable adequate preparation for trial.33 These processes are important for the
Prosecutor to follow, failure of which would result in the defense counsel claiming lack
of sufficient evidence to believe that the person committed the crimes.

The Arrest Procedure
James Meernik in his article “Justice, Power and Peace: Conflicting Interests and
the Apprehension of ICC Suspects,” had a point when he observed that the apprehension
of suspects was the one absolutely most important thing that must be realized in order for
the ICC to fulfill its mission to provide judicial accountability for violations of
international humanitarian law.34

This observation is indeed important in that violators

of gross human rights would continue to do so if they observe that the international
community is failing to protect the vulnerable members of communities.

33
34

Ibid., 165
James Meernik, “Justice, Power and Peace: Conflicting Interests and the Apprehension of ICC
Suspects.” International Criminal Law Review 13 (2013): 169-190.
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The Rome Statute provided the way to pursue the arrest of the accused person
which requires the ICC Prosecutor to submit an application requesting the Pre-Trial
Chamber to authorize the issuance of a summons for the accused person to appear.
However, the arrested person must be informed under which law he was arrested and the
reasons for being held.35

The procedure for arrest is that after the Court has been notified that a situation of
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court had been committed, the Prosecutor will take
the matter to the Pre-Trial Chamber to make a decision on a warrant of arrest. The
Chamber will only issue a warrant of arrest if it finds that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that the accused has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.36 As
regards the issue of admissibility, the statutory test of admissibility is found in Article 17
of the Rome Statute. The test has two distinct parts. The first part of the test involves an
examination of past or present investigations or prosecutions carried out by a State for the
acts that constitute the alleged ICC offence and the case is not admissible unless the State
is unwilling or unable to carry out a genuine investigation or prosecution.37 The second
part of the test is one of gravity; if the case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further
action by the Court, the case is inadmissible before the ICC.38

This clarification on the

procedure for arrest goes a long way in minimizing tension between states parties and the
Court regarding the issue of admissibility.

35

36

37
38

Dragona Radosavljevic, “Mala Captus Dentus and the Right to Challenge the Legality of Arrest
under the ICC Statute.” Liverpool Law Review (2008): 269-285.
Stephen Elliot Smith, “Inventing the Laws of Gravity: The ICC‟s Initial Lubanda Decision and its
Regressive Consequences.” International Criminal Law Review, 8 (2008): 331-351.
Ibid., 335
Ibid., 335
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The Conditions for a Trial by the Court

While the Rome Statute does not have detailed provisions regarding the conduct
and phasing of the proceedings, Article 64 (6) (d) of the ICC Statute sets out that the Trial
Chamber may order the production of evidence in addition to that already collected prior
to the trial or presented during the trial by parties.39 In addition, Article 69 (3) requires
that the Court shall have the authority to request the submission for the determination of
the truth while Regulation 43 of the Regulations of the Court stipulates that the presiding
shall, in consultation with other members of the Chamber determine the mode and order
of the questioning of witnesses.

Stipulations of Rule 140 (2) requires that;

A party that submits evidence in accordance with Article 69, paragraph 3,
by way of witness, has the right to question that witness

The Trial Chamber has a right to question a witness before or after a
witness is questioned by a participant referred to in sub-rules 2(a) or (b).

The Defence shall have the right to be the last to examine witness.

At a Pre-Trial conference the Trial Chamber may call upon the Prosecutor to
shorten the estimated length of the examination-in-chief for some witnesses as well as to
determine the number of witnesses the Prosecutor may call and the time available for the

39

Stefan Kirshch, “The Trial Proceedings before the ICC.” International Criminal Law Review 6,
(2006): 275-292
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Prosecutor for presenting evidence.40 Also, during trial, each party is entitled to call
witnesses and present evidence and if after the close of the case for the Prosecution, the
Trial Chamber finds that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction on the one or
more counts charged in the indictment, the Trial Chamber shall order the entry of a
judgment of acquittal in respect of those counts.41

It therefore follows that effectiveness of the Court is determined by how well these steps
progress and if the state where the crimes took place cooperates in the arrest, handing
over evidence and facilitating access to witnesses. And, by looking at the requirements
of the Rome Statute visa-a-vis the investigation requirements, the arrest procedure and
the conditions for trial set by the Court, observers are are also better able to assess the
effectiveness of the Court.

40
41

Ibid, 280
Ibid, 281
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CHAPTER IV

GENERAL CASES

The Rome Statute came into force in 2002 and can only take up cases that were
committed from July 1, 2002 and onwards. The Court has received a number of referrals,
all of which are from Africa. This Chapter will examine the situations that were referred
to the Court in a more general sense and only broad factors of the case in question will be
discussed. Discussions will be centered on who initiated the case, the background history
of the issue, the referral and how the Court has dealt with the case.
Some of the cases that were brought to the Court from the African Continent since
the Rome Statute came into force include: Libya, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC), Cote d‟Ivoire, Uganda and Kenya. Of these cases, Sudan, the Democratic
of Congo and Kenya are the case studies which will be dealt with in greater detail in
Chapters V, VI and VII. The purpose of discussing the three case studies in depth will
help us to establish whether the hypothesis of the thesis can be proven.
In his article “Africa‟s relationship with the International Criminal Court: More
Political than Legal,” Rowland Cole observes that even though the African Continent
played an important role in the realization of the Court, the Africans now seem to be of
the view that political considerations have taken the lead in the work of the ICC and this
continues to form an obstacle to the realization of international criminal justice.42 This
view of the Court by Africans, if proven to be credible perhaps runs the risk of
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discrediting the Court whose services are needed much more now than before,
considering that human rights violations seem to be on the increase in Eastern Europe,
the Middle East and elsewhere. While the question that this thesis is trying to address
concerns the effectiveness of the Court, going through the background history of some of
the African cases and establishing how the Court dealt with the issues that were referred
to it will help to shed some light in answering some of the questions that are being raised
about the Court.
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LIBYA
Libya is an Arab country that is located in North Africa. It borders with Tunisia
to the West, Egypt to the East, Sudan to the South East and Chad and Niger to the South.
The country has tribal issues and it has been run along tribal lines since time immemorial.
Tribal pressures are the main bone of contention in the country and to keep these
pressures from running high there is therefore a need for impartial democratic
governance. It seems that under the Qaddafi leadership, discontent among the different
tribes of Libya was increasing because of the political system that Qaddafi had
established was not ideal for the general populace. Because the system was run on
partisanship lines, the system started to weaken leading to an uprising that finally took
Gaddafi' own life in 2011.43 When the uprising started in the eastern city of Benghazi,
Gaddafi's harsh reaction angered the protestors even more. The Libyan people continued
with their protests while demanding justice for human rights violations that had been
perpetrated by the government during and before the uprising. An example of the human
rights violations that were committed by the Gaddafi regime is racism. Dark skinned
Libyans had been victims of racism and displacement by the regime in the cities such as
Tawergah and Misrata.44
The reaction by the general populace to Gaddafi's rule shows that the political
system that Gaddafi had instituted in Libya did not auger well with the people. Qaddafi
has been reported to have resorted to the tactic of divide and rule and used his own tribe
and two other major tribes whom he showered with favors and positions to secure his
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leadership position.45 The Libyan people wanted a change from Gaddafi's 42 year rule,
hence the reason for staging a rebellion. While Gaddafi is dead, the Libyan people
deserve justice and accountability by those who committed atrocities during the rebellion.

Qaddafi’ reaction to the Uprising and the Security Council's response
Qaddafi‟s response to the uprising came in the form of detention of human rights
lawyers, shooting of demonstrators by the security forces and air force bombing of
civilians. As the Libyan revolt developed into an armed insurrection, the regime
responded by crushing both the armed rebels and peaceful demonstrators.46 The
deterioration of the situation in Libya led to the adoption of Resolution 1970 by the
UNSC. Resolution 1970 imposed a series of international sanctions on Libya while
referring the situation to the Prosecutor of the ICC.47 The Prosecutor of the ICC in turn
concluded that the situation in Libya warranted an investigation after which the Pre-Trial
Chamber issued arrest warrants against Muammar Gaddafi, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi and
Abdullah Senussi.48 Meanwhile the United Nations Security Council, through the
adoption of Resolution 1973, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, authorized the
international community to use „all means‟ necessary to protect Libyan civilians.49
Resolution 1973 authorized Member States acting nationally or through regional
organizations to protect civilians under attack in the country including Benghazi.50 On
the sanctions side, the resolution tightened an asset freeze and arms embargo. While
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some critics questioned NATO's involvement in Libya, Resolution 1973 clearly
authorized and gave NATO the power to support the Libyan rebels who eventually won
the war.

Current Situation in Libya – National Transitional Council (NTC) vs. the Court on
the trial of Saif al-Islam Gaddafi
There is a standoff between the NTC, the Court and the chambers over the
applicability of the Court‟s complementary regime under SC referrals. The Rome Statute
states that the Court will defer investigation and prosecution to a state with jurisdiction
unless that State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out an investigation or
prosecution. While Libya continues to argue that it can try Saif al-Islam Gaddafi in Libya
under the Libyan laws, the ICC Appeal Chamber rejected all the appeals brought by the
Libyan authorities, citing lack of an effective justice system in Libya.51 The Court is of
the opinion that Libya does not have the capacity to handle the trial in the country. Yet
the million dollar question is what would then happen if the impasse continues?
According to Amnesty International, what is likely to happen is that the Security Council,
the initiating entity to the situation in Libya, will have no choice but to hold the Libyan
authorities accountable by demanding Libya to comply with its legal obligations.

Conclusion
The Libyan situation is a Security Council referral which took place in 2011. At
the time of writing this thesis, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi is in the custody of the Libyan
authorities. Discussions between the Court and Libya are still ongoing. The Court wants
51
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Saif to be handed over to The Hague to enable victims to exercise their rights to
participate in the proceedings and to enable them to seek reparations but the Libyan
authorities are adamant.
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COTE D’IVOIRE

Cote d'Ivoire, is a West African country that borders Liberia, Guinea, Mali,
Burkina Faso and Ghana. During the 1960s and 1970s when the country was under the
helm of Houphouet-Boigny, the country was a power house in West Africa because of its
production of cocoa and coffee.52 Although many considered Houphoet-Boigny a PanAfricanist, the staunch leader maintained very good relations with his former masters, the
French. An argument by some scholars was the country did well because the French
were in control of the economic situation in the country and the Colonial Pact dictated.
The point is that Houphoet-Boigny's link with French resulted in a permanent military
base in Abidjan.53 This in itself will help us to understand the kind of relationship that
existed between Cote d'Ivoire and France when Houphoet-Boigny was at the helm of
power.
The situation in Cote d'Ivoire took a bad turn in the late 1980s when Laurent
Gbagbo came to power and the country experienced an economic downturn which was
followed by a coup d'etat. Even though President Gbagbo tried to form a government of
national unity with rebel leaders in 2002, these peace efforts failed to hold.

The Political situation in Cote d'Ivoire in 2010 and 2011
A political crisis ensued in 2010 when presidential elections were held and the
crisis deepened even further in 2011. The year 2010 marked the end of Gbagbo's second
unelected mandate when the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG)
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together with France and the US certified Ouattara's election victory with over 50% of
the votes.54 The crisis worsened when Gbagbo continued to declare himself a winner
while refusing to step down. The stalemate that followed as a result of the refusal by
these two contending candidates to back down resulted in serious human rights violations
which left 3000 people dead including children and 150 women who were raped by
Gbagbo forces.55 The continuation of human rights violations in the country led the
Prosecutor to open the Cote d'Ivoire case at his own initiative and referred the situation to
Pre-Trial Chamber I. The decision to make this initiative by the Prosecutor was made
following the filing of a declaration by Ivorian authorities under Article 12 of the ICC
Statute.56 The Pre-Trial Chamber I in turn confirmed the charges of crimes against
humanity against Gbagbo and moved the case to trial. Gbagbo was captured by the
Ivorian authorities in April 2011 and he was transferred to the Hague in November 2011
following issuance of an arrest warrant by the Court.57 The charges against Gbabgo
include murder, rape, persecution and other inhuman acts committed between December
2010 and April 2011.

Cote d'Ivoire and the Rome Statute – Should Cote d'Ivoire abide by the Rome
Statute?
Although Cote d'Ivoire is not state party to the Rome Statute, Gbagbo however
submitted a declaration under Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute accepting the Court's
jurisdiction beginning September 2002 while he was still in office. And, when Outtara
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came into power, he confirmed Cote d'Ivoire's acceptance of jurisdiction in December
2010 and in May 2011.58 In addition to issuing an arrest warrant against Gbagbo,
unsealed warrants were also issued against Simone Gbagbo, the former President's wife
and Charles Ble Goude, Gbagbo's former Youth Minister on charges of crimes against
humanity. 59
The Ivorian authorities responded by surrendering Goude to the Hague on the
ICC's arrest warrant. As for Simone Gbagbo, the Ivorian authorities argue that they will
try her under Ivorian law. Although Human Rights Watch reports that the Ivorian
authorities have the option of challenging the ICC's jurisdiction over Simone Gbagbo's
case, Ivorian Civil Society and the United Nations officials have expressed concern that
prosecutions against only the Gbagbo camp may stoke further tensions and damage the
ICC's credibility in the country.60

Current Situation in Cote d'Ivoire and Criticism of the Prosecutor
Although the starting date of trial for former President Gbabgo is yet to be
announced, it appears that judges who preside over Pre-Trial Chamber I are of the view
that the Prosecution had failed to put forward enough evidence to support the charges.
Meanwhile scholars who are familiar with the Gbagbo case question whether the election
conflict that resulted in human rights violations in Cote d'Ivoire was a fight between
Gbagbo and Ouattara or whether it had something to do with political squabbles between
the former colonizer (the French) and Gbabo. Yet, regardless of whatever the cause of
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the tension was, human rights violations were committed in Cote d'Ivoire and those who
were directly involved must be brought to justice. Also questions about Ouattara's
involvement are likely to raise the eyebrows of the international community and of those
who lost their loved ones in light of the Prosecutor's lack of action against Ouattara.

It

should be pointed out that these are some of the issues that are likely to tarnish the
effectiveness of the Court.
One of the issues that is being debated arose from the view that, while the Court is
relying on a declaration made by Cote d'Ivoire in 2003, the declaration only covers events
preceding its submission and not acts which took place some seven years after it was
made.61 Although the Court was quick to defend itself by stating that that the ICC was
acting on a declaration that Ouattara submitted to the Court, critics point to the
impartiality of the Court which is failing to issue arrest warrants to Ouattara's camp in
spite of the mounting evidence that has been documented by Human Rights Watch and
other researchers.

Gbagbo's request rebuffed by the Security Council
The defence lawyers requested for Gbagbo's interim release which was denied.
Some scholars argue against the Prosecutor's refusal to consider Gbagbo's request for
interim release. They state that the Prosecutor's argument that Gbabgo still had power
ambitions and that his release has the potential to link him to his national and
international contacts that might allow him to abscond are determined purely by political
and not legal considerations.62 While some of these concerns being raised may sound
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trivial, they are indeed important when it comes to legal technical considerations when
the case finally gets to be tried. However, the other thing to put into consideration is that,
it is not up to the prosecutor but the Security Council, who can pass a one-year
moratorium.

Conclusion
The Cote d'Ivoire situation is a Prosecutor's proprio motu action which took place
in 2011 after gross human rights violations were committed by both pro-Gbagbo's forces
and some people who are in Ouattara's camp. Former President Laurent Gbagbo is in
custody in the Hague following the death of about 3000 innocent civilians. While the
date for the trial is yet to be set by the Court, many issues which range from the Court's
mandate to try Gbagbo in the Hague and lack of issuance of arrest warrants to the
Ouattara camp by the Prosecutor of the ICC are being raised. Even though critics of the
Court also question the Prosecutor's professionalism for using political considerations
instead of legal considerations in addressing Gbagbo's request for interim release, it
should be noted that fear of flight in regards to bond release is a legitimate legal reason.
Although the new Prosecutor is said to have started well in her deliberations, the
international community awaits to see how the case will evolve, particularly taking into
account that the new Prosecutor of the ICC, Fatou Bensouda is a woman of African
origin.
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UGANDA
The Republic of Uganda

The Ugandan situation to the ICC was a state referral. President Yoweri
Museveni referred the situation in the country to the ICC in 2003. But before we venture
into the case, we have to look at the history that led to this situation.

Uganda is an East African country which boarders the Democratic Republic of
Congo, Kenya, South Sudan, Rwanda and Tanzania. The issue that brought the Ugandan
situation to the ICC concerns the civil war that ravaged the northern part of the country
for a long time. The northern part of Uganda which is commonly referred to as
“Acholiland” had been embroiled in a civil war that took place between the government
and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) that was led by Joseph Kony for over twenty
years.63 Although Uganda's internal destabilization which came in the form of civil wars
and coup d'etats have a history that dates back before 2002, it was Yoweri Museveni who
finally referred the situation in the country to the ICC.

Background History of the Ugandan Civil War

During the 1980s, the political situation in Uganda was volatile due to a series of
coup d'etats that took place prior to the civil war that was started by Joseph Kony. For
example, in 1985 Olara-Okelo overthrew the government of Milton Obote and within a
year Yoweri Museveni and his army, the National Resistance Army (NRA) in turn staged
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a coup that ousted Okelo from office and this resulted in a bloody civil war that was led
by Joseph Kony.64
The history of the Lord‟s Resistance Army dates back to 1986 when the National
Resistance Army (NRA) led by Yoweri Museveni overthrew General Tito Okelo who
was an Acholi, from the northern part of Uganda. After the overthrow, those who were
in power were disgruntled and in order for them to be able to protect the empires they had
built for themselves, they decided to support Joseph Kony who had started the
rebellion.65

By 1991, Kony and the LRA resorted to large scale attacks on civilians,

raiding schools and clinics while engaging in cruel activities such as cutting off limbs,
ears and lips and gauging out eyes of vulnerable Acholi people.66 In order to sustain his
activities, Kony exploited civilians and carried out the abduction of children for use as
child soldiers. According to some statistics, as many as 25000 to 30000 children were
abducted and used as child soldiers by the LRA since 1987.67 Abuse and the abduction
of children left the Acholi people in a situation where they suffered a double tragedy.
First, the Acholi people suffered human rights violations when Museveni advanced to
wrestle power from Okelo, then they also suffered from the inhuman treatment and loss
of their children when the self-portrayed spirit medium, Joseph Kony, led the rebellion.
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2002 – The Tipping Point for the LRA

The year 2002 is regarded as the turning point for the LRA because most of their
activities were contained when Uganda reopened diplomatic relations with Sudan.68 This
development negatively affected the operations of the LRA since Kony‟s men had bases
for training and hiding in Sudan. The diplomatic relations enabled the Ugandan People‟s
Defence Forces (UPDF) to pursue the LRA in Sudan and to curtail the movement of food
and communication to LRA‟s bases.69 Although Kony did not put down arms, this
development seems to have played a role for Kony to accept peace talks between himself
and the Museveni's regime which were mediated by the government of South Sudan and
which resulted in a ceasefire in 2006.70 The ceasefire did not hold for long because Kony
decided to go back into the bush. Kony is still at large up to this day.
Kony’s Indictment

President Museveni referred the situation in the country to the ICC in 2003 and in
July 2004, the ICC Prosecutor began an investigation into LRA crimes and then issued
arrest warrants to five LRA commanders namely Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot
Odhiambo, Dominic Ongwen and Raska Kukwiya in 2005.71 The charges against these
commanders include murder, rape, sexual slavery and forcing children to serve as
combatants. While Uganda signed the Rome Statute in 2002, the country became the
first state to make a referral to the ICC.
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Conclusion
There are many issues raised inside and outside the country concerning Uganda‟s
referral to the ICC. These issues range from the question of admissibility, impartiality,
amnesty, accountability and reconciliation most of which were initiated within the
country by the Ugandans themselves. Although Kony is still at large, some scholars
question the impartiality of the Court as questions continue to be raised regarding
massacres which Museveni and his men are alleged to have committed against the Acholi
people before toppling Okelo‟s government.

On the issue of admissibility some critics argue that Uganda has not shown that it
is unwilling or unable to genuinely carry out investigations or prosecutions as stipulated
under Article 17 (1)(a) of the Rome Statute. It therefore follows that if this is the case,
the ICC does not have a mandate on this situation. In addition, in 2000, Uganda at the
request of victims passed a national Amnesty Act which allowed anyone who denounces
violence, regardless of rank, to return to his/her community without fear of possible
prosecution. In this regard, the ICC's arrest warrants that were issued in spite of the
Amnesty Act are viewed as having a negative effect on the efforts that the Uganda people
are making towards peace building.

In 2007, the government and the LRA signed an agreement on accountability and
reconciliation which states in Article 3.1 that traditional justice mechanisms shall be
promoted as a central part of the framework for accountability and reconciliation. These
efforts are being made by the Ugandans themselves to create peace and reconciliation as
well as promote national healing using Uganda's traditional justice system. Yet, others
37

argue that these efforts should only be used to complement the criminal justice process
that the ICC is pursuing in Uganda.
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CHAPTER V

CASE STUDY – THE REPUBLIC OF KENYA

The Republic of Kenya
The world map shows that the Republic of Kenya is a country that is situated in
East Africa and lies on the Equator. It borders Uganda, Tanzania, South Sudan, Ethiopia
and Somalia.

Kenya's General Election of 2007
In 2007, Kenya held its general elections. The election was marred with violence
which, according to Sievers and Peters, took the form of ethnic conflict between
communities that had voted for Mwai Kibaki of the Party National Unity (PNU) and
those who had voted for Raila Odinga of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM).72
The announcement of Mwai Kibaki as the winner of the election triggered and fueled
unrest in country. While the victory of Kibaki continued to be questioned and disputed
by the opposition, the civil society and domestic and international observers, the internal
strife worsened daily between the supporters of Kibaki and those of Odinga. Although
Kofi Annan came in and brokered a power sharing deal which brought some calm in the
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country in 2008, the help came too late.73 At least more than 1500 innocent lives were
lost and about 350 000 families displaced with hundreds of women having been raped.74
It would appear that just like in the Libyan situation, the underlying issues in the
Kenyan politics are mainly to do with ethnic tensions. In Kenya these tensions have
more to do with issues of land and resource distribution. For examples, Mwai Kibaki
commands a Kikuyu strong following and while Raila Odinga's base includes the
Kalenjin, Luo and Luhya tribes.75 These ethnic prejudices seem to have been
problematic during elections since the country acquired its independence in 1963. Jomo
Kenyatta and Arap Moi are said to have used one-party state rule and used repressive rule
as a way of containing these tensions.76

If Kenyan elections are known to suffer from

ethnic tensions, which of the two contending leaders was responsible for the 2007 postelection violence? Reports emanating from the Kenyan media show that while the PNU
for the most part carried out much of the violence, the ODM was also equally to blame.

The Waki Commission
Following the 2007 post-election violence which led to the deaths of more than a
thousand people including rape and displacement of hundreds of families, an independent
Commission of Inquiry known as the Waki Commission and a Special Tribunal were set
up to investigate the cause of these disturbances. Yet, not much was accomplished in
terms of bringing to light those who were responsible for committing the atrocities.
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Waki Commission, in an attempt to find a solution to this problem, recommended a twopronged approach to the problem: 1) that a hybrid special tribunal with a mandate to
prosecute crimes committed as a result of the post election violence be instituted, 2) and
that as an alternative, names of the alleged perpetrators be sent to the ICC Prosecutor,
Louis Moreno Ocampo to conduct further investigations.77 Even though the Kenyan
government and courts had a full year to act on the Waki recommendations to bring those
who were responsible for the massacres to justice, no credible action was taken by the
government authorities.

The Government of the Republic of Kenya's reaction to the Waki Commission
Perhaps not knowing what to do with the Waki Commission that had opened a
can of worms, the Kenyan authorities instead of taking steps to make a follow up on the
recommendations of the Waki Commission, used some tactics to buy time. The tactics
included shifting goal posts and supporting the ICC at one point and the hybrid special
tribunal at another point.
The passing of a whole year with nothing concrete in sight shows in way that the
Kenyan government was not keen to address the problem it was confronted with. Some
critics of the Kenyan crisis believed that the Kenyan authorities were not interested in
prioritizing this problem because they wanted to protect some authorities who might have
been responsible for the atrocities. Sriram Chandra et al. noted that during the entire
2009 the government of Kenya used tactics that included members of Parliament voting
down the Waki Commission, citing lack of confidence in the Commission as one of the
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reasons.78 Yet, the credible reason for voting down the Waki Commission was fear of a
possible prosecution of authorities who were now in power in the event that the
Commission turned effective.

The Prosecutor's reaction to the situation in Kenya
In 2009, the Office of the ICC Prosecutor tried to convince the office of the then
President, Mwai Kibaki to initiate domestic proceedings on the matter but the
government was not forthcoming. It kept shifting positions between their support for the
hybrid tribunal and the ICC.79 Meanwhile, there appeared to be a consensus between the
Prosecutor and Kenyan Civil Society regarding the entity that was appropriate to deal
with the Kenyan situation. Not only was the Prosecutor supportive of the ICC to handle
the Kenyan situation, the Prosecutor also supported the establishment of a Special
Tribunal. Other parties such as Kenyan Civil Society organizations also supported the
Prosecutor's position.80 In fact, the Prosecutor's proposition seemed to be the best option
because the entities that he proposed namely the ICC, the tribunal and the Truth, Justice
and Reconciliation Commission were each meant to handle different situations that
needed to be addressed. The way the three proposed entities were going to functions is as
follows: a) the ICC was conceived ideal for dealing with atrocities while b) the tribunal
was expected to look into other issues that were not too serious and c) a Truth, Justice
and Reconciliation Commission was needed for establishing an accurate historical
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account of abuses that took place since independence and to deal with restitution issues.81
This approach, if implemented, has the potential to bring long lasting peace as far as
ethnic tensions are concerned in Kenya.
When 2009 passed with nothing in light that showed that the Kenyan government
was taking concrete steps or actions to deal with the perpetrators of the 2007 massacres,
the ICC Prosecutor requested in 2010 that six individuals be summoned to appear before
the Court. These were names that were contained in the famous Waki envelope that was
handed to the Prosecutor by Kofi Annan. The six suspects were William Samoei Ruto
(Minister of Higher Education, Science and Technology), Henry Kiprono Kosgey
(Member of Parliament and Chairman of the ODM), Joshua Arap Sang (Radio Host),
Francis Kirimi Mathaura (Head of the Public Service and Secretary to the Cabinet),
Uhuru Migai Kenyatta (Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance), and
Mohammed Hussein Ali (Chief Executive of the Postal Corporation). The first stage that
the Prosecutor is required to engage in is to conduct an analysis of the seriousness of the
available information. Then, he must file an application to proceed with an investigation
if there was a reasonable basis for an indictment, pursuant to Article 15 (3).82 When the
Prosecutor took the necessary steps and initiated the case, the Kenyan government did not
take the Prosecutor's action lightly.

In response to the Prosecutor's initiative, the

Government of Kenya filed an application in 2011 citing Article 19 as the basis of its
challenge to the Pre-Trial Chamber's ruling of admissibility.83 The Kenyan government
argued that it was carrying out investigations in respect to persons at the same level in the
hierarchy being investigated by the ICC and to prove its point, it attached annexes to
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documents that it sent to the Court.84 The government of Kenya also tried to counter the
Prosecutor's initiative by passing a unanimous motion to withdraw from the Rome
Statute.85 However, the Chamber, not withstanding all these efforts, dismissed the
government's efforts. The Chamber argued that the government's submissions lacked
specificity as it did not provide proof that concrete steps in the investigations were being
carried out and that the kind of sufficient investigation required by the Chamber must
provide evidence of a sufficient degree of specificity and probative value as spelled out in
Article 19 of the Rome Statute.86
Unfortunately this move did not help the government simply because the Rome
Statute requires that a formal withdrawal request takes effect after one year. Moreover,
the Court's jurisdiction over the case could not be removed regardless of the withdrawal.
Thus, out of the six cases, two cases were rejected by the Pre-Trial Chamber II in 2012.87
Of the four remaining cases, William Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang of the ODM party were
indicted on charges that contain crimes against humanity including murder, forcible
transfer and persecution allegedly committed against PNU supporters.88 The other two
remaining cases include the current President Uhuru Kenyata whose charges also specify
crimes against humanity, including murder, forcible transfer, rape, persecution and other
inhuman acts allegedly committed against ODM supporters in retaliation to attacks
against the PNU supporters.89 Meanwhile, statistics on sexual violence, according to a
study carried out by Kirsten et al., was reported to be on the increase during the election
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violence period and that both male and female perpetrators were affiliated with the
government. Perhaps this might help to explain why the Kenyan government failed to
bring to light the culprits who were involved in the 2007 post-election atrocities.

The Issue of Complementarity and the Prosecutor's Initiative
The complementarity principle enshrined in the Rome Statute sets out the nature
of the relationship between the ICC and national jurisdictions and provides the means by
which the admissibility of cases brought before the ICC can be determined. While Article
15 of the Rome Statute provides that the Prosecutor can initiate investigations proprio
motu into crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court, the Prosecutor, was, in the case of
Kenya, required to show credible grounds for opening the case since the complementarity
regime of the Rome Statute seeks to strike a balance between safeguarding the sovereign
rights of states and the goal of ending impunity for the most heinous crimes.90
The issue of complementarity becomes problematic when it comes to striking the
balance between safeguarding sovereignty of states and the need to end impunity.
Nevertheless, the issue of punishing those who commit heinous crimes is a concern for
the international community, hence the creation of the ICC.
Complementarity is a fundamental cornerstone of the ICC framework. It has to
be dealt with cautiously because it has the potential to make or break the reputation of the
Court. It acts as a gatekeeper between a state's primary duty to investigate and prosecute
international crimes and the Prosecutor's independent ability to step in when a state is
unable or unwilling to do so.91 But, was the Chamber correct when it agreed that the
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elements of gravity and complementarity were met for the ICC to take the prosecution of
the Kenyan post-election violence into its own hands? The study by Elizabeth Kumundi
which analyzed the Majority Decision of the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II of 31 March
2010, allowing the Prosecutor to open an investigation into the situation in Kenya claims
that the Chamber was correct.92 Yet, the troubling issue is that the Justice Philip Waki
Commission seems to contradict the analysis of both the Court and Elizabeth Kumundi.
While the Chamber and Kumundi are in agreement that the Kenyan post-election
violence met the threshold for the Court to intervene, a report by Fatou Bensouda, the
current ICC Prosecutor seems to be in direct contradiction by stating that the former
Prosecutor Moreno Ocampo intimated that the Waki Commission was not sure whether
there was enough evidence to meet the threshold required by the ICC. The report further
states that Justice Waki explained his position to some NGO activists when he stated that,

…the evidence the Commission had gathered was not in their
assessment sufficient to meet the threshold of proof required for
the criminal matters in Kenya and that he believed that the
Commission' evidence forms a basis for more investigation on the
alleged perpetrators.93

Could the explanation by Judge Waki also help to explain why Belgian Judge Christine
Van Den Wyngaert dropped out of the case? Judge Wyngaert questioned the
Prosecutor's conduct in the investigation of the case. She thought that the Prosecution did
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not meet the threshold of his obligation at the time when he sought confirmation from the
Chamber; an observation which she thought was explained during the proceedings before
the Chamber.94 Perhaps one is tempted to take Judge Wyngaert's concerns into
perspective especially if one takes into consideration the fact that the African Union is
also up in arms with the way the Hague-based court is being run. The AU is of the view
that the Security Council is using careless analysis to distort the purpose of the Court.
The AU further alleges that the ICC is being used to install leaders of the powerful
Western countries' choice in Africa with the aim of eliminating the ones they do not
like.95

It appears, however that the Africans' concerns are partly substantiated by some

scholars who claim that the Court was used by powerful Western countries to bring about
regime change in Libya.
Therefore, in order to show the credibility of the Kenyan case, the Prosecutor
relied on evidence that was provided by the Waki Commission as well as using reports
from a range of Kenyan and International NGOs.96 As regards to the issue of the
Principle of Complementarity, both the judges and the Prosecutor had to utilize the
standards enumerated in Article (17) (1) of the Rome Statute. Article (17) (1) enumerates
that, the Court will not have jurisdiction if the case is being investigated or prosecuted by
a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the state is unwilling or unable genuinely to
carry out the investigation or prosecution.97 The Prosecutor's argument was substantiated
because the Kenyan government had failed to prove its willingness to carry out the
investigation particularly in light of the fact that the government had a whole year (2009)
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at its disposal to deal with the case. Even though the government of Kenya argued that
the issue was under their jurisdiction and that the government was looking into it, their
case was not valid since the Rome Statute suggests that the question of complementarity
hinges on the question of actual investigations or prosecutions and not prospective ones.
The government had not proved that actual investigations or prosecutions were being
carried out.

Interpretation of the issue of Complementarity in the Kenyan issue
There is a clear distinction between a state's failure to pursue prosecutions and not
being willing to pursue domestic prosecutions. In order to be able to understand the
difference between the two, we need to look at what the Rome Statute says about
unjustified delays and the unwillingness or inability to pursue cases. While Article 17
(1)(a) states that the ICC can determine the inadmissibility of a case if the state is
unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution, Brighton
argues that Article 17 (1)(a) does not only set out a two pronged test based solely on
unwillingness or inability but that it established a two-tier test which encompasses 3
distinct elements.98 According to Brighton, the activity element involves the tier which
asks if the case is being investigated or prosecuted by a state with jurisdiction and if the
response is positive. Complementarity then becomes automatic, but if the response is in
the negative, then the determination shifts to the second tier which encompasses the
unwillingness and inability elements which are defined in Article 17(2).99 This tier
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determines whether the nature and quality of domestic proceedings renders intervention
by the ICC necessary.
The Rome Statute also distinguishes between unjustified delays and the
unwillingness or inability to pursue cases through its interpretations of Article 17. While
article 17(2)(a, b) discusses an unjustified delay in proceedings which is consistent with
the intent of bringing the person concerned to justice, Article 17(2)(a, c) refers to
proceedings that are undertaken with the purpose of shielding a person from prosecution.
It would appear that the Kenyan situation fell under article 17(2)(a, c).100 This is
explained by the way the Kenyan government continued to shift positions while ignoring
the recommendations of the Waki Commission. The judges, on the issue of
complementarity, felt that there was no need to assess whether Kenya is unwilling or
unable to prosecute. Instead the judges needed to consider whether there were
investigations in respect of likely future subjects of ICC prosecutions. The Prosecutor's
approach was a new approach which promoted a “three-pronged strategy” in which top
level perpetrators would be handled by the ICC, middle level perpetrators were to be
handled by the hybrid tribunal and the Truth Commission would be left to deal with
reparations, institutional reform and traditional justice.101
Conclusion
As noted above, Chapter V discusses the Kenyan situation following the 2007
post-election results. As a country that was a state party to the ICC in 2007, Kenya was
expected to abide by the requirements of the Rome Statute when atrocities were
committed by supporters of the two major parties that were contesting in the 2007
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election. When Kenya failed to expose the culprits who had committed the 2007
atrocities, the Prosecutor, using the powers enshrined upon him through Article 15 of the
Rome Statute of the ICC referred the situation to the Pre-Trial Chamber II seeking
authorization to initiate investigation.
Did the Prosecutor follow the right procedures in his pursuit to seek justice for the
thousands who lost their lives or those who got raped or displaced in the 2007 Kenyan
post-election violence? Admissibility was determined, arrest warrants were issued to
those individuals who were cited in the Waki Commission but the current status quo is
that Uhuru Kenyata and William Ruto, two of the four indicted people were selected by
the people of Kenya to run for the highest office of the land. The Belgian Judge
Christine Van Den Wyngaert dropped out of the case for lack of confidence in the
Prosecutor. The African Union is up in arms with the way the institution is being run.
The AU alleges that the ICC is being dictated to by powerful Western countries who
want to bring regime changes in Africa. The more the Kenyan government argues that it
is taking care of the situation which falls within its jurisdiction by way of pursuing the
investigation vigorously, the more the Chamber demands the Kenyan government to
produce concrete evidence to its claim.
The Kenyan situation is a Prosecutor proprio motu initiated case. Even though
cooperation between the initiating entity which in this case is the Prosecutor and the
Court is high, the effectiveness of the Court's is not yet proven by this fact since the case
is still pending. The major hurdle in this case is the issue of admissibility. There is a tug
of war between the Court and the state on who has jurisdiction over the situation. We are
yet to see how the situation will unfold since many actors are being drawn into the issue.
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CHAPTER VI

CASE STUDY – THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

The Democratic Republic of Congo and the Lubanga Trial

The Democratic Republic of Congo, formerly known as Zaire, is a gigantic
country which is situated in Central Africa. It borders nine countries namely, the
Republic of Congo, Tanzania, Central African Republic, South Sudan, Uganda, Rwanda,
Burundi, Zambia and Angola. Because of its vastness, the country is experiencing
challenges to provide security along its borders.
Thus, for quite some time, the eastern part of the country known as the Ituri
region has been famously known for harboring war lords from the DRC, Uganda and
Rwanda.102 One of the Congolese notorious war lords, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo hailes
from Ituri. As one of the co-founders of the Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC),
Lubanga was also the Commander-in-Chief of the party‟s military wing, the Forces
Patriotique pour la Liberation du Congo (FPLC).103 The UPC‟s agenda was to gain
political and military control over the Ituri district in the northeast of the DRC.
The Democratic Republic of Congo is a country that had been faced with
perennial internal disturbances dating back from the time of Mobutu Sese Seko and the
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problems still continued even after the Mobutu‟ regime had long gone. In 1998, the
country faced a rebellion that was led by Laurent Desire Kabila which ousted Mobutu
Sese Seko from power. And, within no time, Laurent Desire Kabila also faced a rebellion.
Tanks to the SADC forces, who after being seized with the situation, came to the rescue
of the Congolese government. Joseph Kabila is now at the helm of power in the
Democratic Republic of Congo. The son Joseph took over after his father died under
circumstances that were not clearly explained to the Congolese people.

Who is Thomas Lubanga Dyilo?
According to Trial Watch, an organization that is determined to bring justice to
victims of international crimes, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo is a Congolese national who was
born in 1960 in Djiba, Ituri District of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Lubanga
holds a degree in Psychology from Kisangani University and he turned to politics to
politics in 1999. In 2000, Lubanga founded his own political party known as the Union
des Patriotes Congolais (UPC) as well as its armed wing the Forces Patriotiques pour la
Liberation du Congo (FPLC). It is a result of the formation of the UPC and the FPLC
that Lubanga actively recruited children under the age of 15 years and forced them to
undergo military training so that they could participate in hostilities and becoming
bodyguards for high ranking officers in the FPLC in the Ituri region where these officers
were operating from. Lubanga became stronger and stronger. In 2002, his party gained
control of the town of Bunia. Lubanga became the Commander-in-Chief of the FPLC
and his forces were accused of the massacre of civilians in Ituri between 2002 and 2003.
More than 800 civilians were reported to have been killed in Ituri by the UPC.
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The Democratic Republic of Congo refers the situation in Ituri to the ICC
Faced with this internal strife in the eastern part of the country, the Government
of Joseph Kabila referred the situation in Ituri region to the ICC. By invoking Article 14
of the Rome Statute of the ICC, the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo
referred the situation in Ituri to the ICC in 2004.104 Article 14 of the Rome Statute states
that:
A State Party may refer to the Prosecutor a situation in which one or more crimes
within the jurisdiction of the Court appear to have been committed requesting the
Prosecutor to investigate the situation for the purpose of determining whether one
or more specific persons should be charge with the commission of such crimes.105

In 2005, Lubanga was arrested by the government and he was detained by state
authorities in Kinshasa for one year before he was transferred to The Hague. At the ICC,
Lubanga was charged and found guilty as a co-perpetrator for enlisting and conscripting
children and using them to participate in hostilities from September 2002 to August
2003.106

Determination of Admissibility
Unlike the Kenyan situation, the Court, in the Lubanga case, was not faced with
the monumental task of determining admissibility of the case. The reason for this is that
the case was a state referral; there was therefore no need for processes such as the
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issuance of an arrest warrant or summons to appear. Moreover the government of the
DRC arrested Lubanga and handed him over to the ICC. Thus, on August 2006, the
Prosecutor filed a document containing the charges, after which Pre-Trial Chamber I
confirmed that there was sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe
that Thomas Lubanga was responsible as a co-perpetrator of the enlisting and
conscripting children under the age of 15 into the FPLC and using them to participate
actively in hostilities from 2 June to 13 August 2003.107

However, the Prosecution was

still faced with the task of fulfilling the requirement of Articles 61 and 66. Article 61 of
the Rome Statute requires that the Chamber find sufficient evidence to establish
substantial grounds to believe that the person committed the crime charged and at trial.
Article 66 requires the Prosecution to prove that the accused committed the crimes
beyond reasonable doubt and Article 64 requires the Trial Chamber to provide for the
disclosure of documents or information not previously disclosed in advance of the
commencement of the trial to enable adequate preparation for trial. Although the Court
managed to try Lubanga who then became the first person to be convicted by the ICC, the
Prosecution has a difficult time to fulfill some of the requirements of the Rome Statute of
the ICC. For example, Trial Chamber 1 ordered, in July 2008, for the release of Lubanga
Dyilo. The reasons for his release were made after the Chamber claimed that the
Prosecutor failed to fulfill the requirements of Article 54(3)(e). Article 54(3)(e)
addresses the issue of non-disclosure of exculpatory material. Pre-Trial Chamber I
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argued that there was evidence of non-disclosure of more than 200 documents which
contained exculpatory information which was also supposed to be used by the defence.108
The ICC Trial Chamber ordered a stay of proceedings in the Lubanga case. The
Chamber concluded that the Prosecution had abused its competence under Article
53(3)(e).109 While the Prosecutor argued that the documents were obtained on condition
of confidentiality hence the failure to make a disclosure, the Trial Chamber insisted that
the Prosecutor was required to abide by Article 67 of the ICC Statute. While Article 67(2)
of the ICC Statute require that the Prosecutor shall disclose to the defense all exculpatory
evidence that tends to show innocence of the accused or mitigate the guilt of the accused,
Article 54(3)(e) provides that, unless otherwise specified in writing, documents held by
MONUC … shall be understood to be provided in accordance with and subject to
arrangements envisaged in Article 18, paragraph 3 of the Relationship Agreement.110
The Prosecutor was supposed to have made initiatives to facilitate the disclosure of the
documents prior to the trial date. Because disclosure of exculpatory evidence goes to the
heart of an accused‟ right to a fair trial, lack of such a disclosure by the Prosecutor may
be concluded to mean that the scale of justice was tilted against Lubanga since the
defence was incapacitated in counterbalancing the greater resources of the Prosecution.
Although the Prosecutor succeeded in the final analysis to convince the Trial
Chamber to reverse its Impugned Decisions, such errors will go down the history of the
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ICC and they will be noted as issues which have the potential to make or to break the
reputation of the Court.

Was the nature of the Armed Conflict Determined in the Lubanga Case?
From the onset, the issue of determination of the nature of the armed conflict was
problematic. While the Prosecution qualified the conflict associated with Lubanga as a
non-international one, the Pre-Trial Chamber I referred the conflict as a sequenced
international/non-international solution. Meanwhile, the Chamber argued that the
conflict was an international one but it later changed it to non-international.111 Yet, it
was of great importance to have the conflict qualified since different groups were
reported to be operating in Ituri. Ambos disagrees with the Chambers rejection that the
conflict was non-international. He believes that the three neighboring countries, the
DRC, Rwanda and Uganda fought their wars through proxies, using Uturi as their base.
Moreover, Ambos expresses his concerns over the Chamber‟s insistence that the forms of
conduct comprise three separate offences, namely “conscripting, enlisting and using” yet
the concept of the offense fell under one element “child soldiers.”

Were the requirements of Article 61 and 66 fulfilled in the The Lubanga Trial
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo was tried and convicted in The Hague for the enlistment
and conscription of children under 15 years in his army, Forces Patriotique pour la
Liberation du Congo (FPLC) on 14 March 2012. This was the first judgment of the
International Criminal Court. Caroline Buisman explains in her article, “Delegating
Investigations: Lessons to be learned from Lubanga Judgement” that the office of the
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Prosecutor faced a hurdle in proving the ages of the child soldiers.112 In order to get the
proof of the ages of children conscripted in the Forces Patriotique pour la Liberation du
Congo (FPLC), on the spot investigation had to be carried out in Ituri yet the situation
was still volatile and active with militia movements. However, the investigation team
that was led by Bernard Levigne, a French magistrate, testified that early investigations in
Ituri posed challenges for the team such that the tactics they initially applied were
discarded. The team had to rely heavily on investigations that were being undertaken by
the United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in Congo (MONUC). Initially, the
investigators contacted village chiefs and former school teachers to verify the age of
specific victims but the method was discarded as it was considered too dangerous for the
children and their families.113 Kurth also noted that generally, investigators used the
Greulich and Pyle (GP) and the Tanner and Whitehouse (T & W) methods and in the
Lubanga case, the investigators used the G & P methods plus teeth examination of the
third molar.
Although the defense argued that Lubanga was opposed to the recruitment of
children and that he had ordered his subordinates to demobilize children under the age of
18 years, the Judges were not persuaded, they further argued that he (Lubanga) used
children below the age 15 as bodyguards, gave speeches and attended rallies where
conscripted and listed children under the age of fifteen were present.114 While Lubanga
tried various tactics to evade the charges that were being pressed against him, the video
footage of children who were seen in the Lubanga entourage was reported to have
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brought the crime scene to the courtroom and it was also viewed as the best piece of
evidence the Prosecutor was able to produce.
In the final analysis, Lubanga was convicted. The Judges treated each charge
separately and sentenced him to 13 years for conscripting child soldiers, 12 years for
enlisting child soldiers and 15 years imprisonment for using child soldiers actively in
hostilities.115 The Chamber was also generous in the end. It deducted the time Lubanga
spent in detention in The Hague but refused to do so for the time he spent in detention in
the DRC. On the DRC detention, the Chamber argued that it did not find sufficient
evidence to ascertain that Lubanga was detained in Kinshasa because of crimes of child
recruitment.116 Given the dire financial situation of the defendant, the Chamber did not
impose an additional fine to benefit the Trust Fund for victims. The Prosecutor argued
that a 14-year sentence fails to give sufficient weight to the gravity of the crimes against
children and the extent of the damage caused to the victims and their families. Lubanga‟s
defense argued that the Trial Chamber erroneously concluded that the recruitment of
children into the FPLC was widespread and that the evidence produced by MONUC
should not have been accepted by the Court. Ultimately, the judges sentenced him to 14
years.

Conclusion
The Democratic of Republic of Congo‟s situation is a state referral.

The

government of the DRC arrested Lubanga and handed him over to the ICC, therefore an
arrest warrant was issued by the Prosecutor as a formality of the Court.
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Although the Prosecutor had problems proving the ages of the alleged victims of
enlistment and conscription, the other problematic issue was for the Court to determine
the nature of the armed conflict. These issues were however ironed out in the final
analysis and Thomas Lubanga Dyilo was convicted in The Hague for the enlistment and
conscription of children under 15 years in his army, the Forces Patriotique pour la
Liberation du Congo (FPLC) on 14 March 2012.
Just like in the Kenyan situation, cooperation between the initiating entity which
in this case is the State and the ICC is high. On the other hand, the effectiveness of the
Court has been proven by the fact that all the procedures of the Rome Statute were
followed which rendered the Court able to determine a guilty verdict in Lubanga‟s case.
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CHAPTER VII

CASE STUDY – SUDAN

The Republic of Sudan and the International Criminal Court
The Republic of Sudan is found in North Africa. It borders Egypt, Eritrea,
Ethiopia, South Sudan, Libya, Central African Republic and Chad.

Historical analysis of Sudan and the Darfur Crisis
There are different schools of thought on the reasons for the conflict that ravaged
Sudan since it attained its independence from the British. Although these conflicts came
in the form of civil wars that pitted the North against the South of the country, no single
factor could explain why there was animosity between the citizens of Sudan. Murecha
and Chigora observed that since attaining independence from Britain, a number of civil
wars took place in Sudan until 2005 when a peace deal known as the Nairobi
Comprehensive Peace Agreed was concluded.117
From the two different schools of thought, there are those who claim that the bone
of contention among various ethnic groups of Sudan has something to do with resources
while the other group contends that the issues are mostly to do with ethnic tribal
differences. The latter explanation appear to carry some substance since that position has
been supported by a number of scholars and organizations that include Usman A. Tar,
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Julie Flint, Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Women Waging Peace (WWP). These
scholars argue that the Darfur crisis can be explained as a genocidal conflict between the
indigenous African tribes and the Afro-Arab tribes in the region. 118
The rebel groups of Darfur who organized against the government complained
that the region of Darfur was marginalized from the rest of the country and in particular
from the northern region. The government of Sudan on the other hand dismissed the
allegations by the rebels by pointing out that the government had made improvements in
Darfur such as building schools, universities, hospitals and health centers etc. These
issues seem to have created a big rift between the government and the rebels who then
organized themselves and continued to carry out attacks on the government. Although
the government denied the reports, indications were that the government enlisted the
Arab Janjaweed militia who went about terrorizing the people of the Darfur. This led to
the displacements of millions of the Southern people of Darfur, an issue that led to the
indictment of al-Bashir by the ICC in 2008.

Who is Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir?
According to the Encyclopedia Britannica, al-Bashir was born on January 7, 1944,
in Hosh Wad Banaqa, Sudan into a peasant family that later moved to Khartoum where
he received his secondary education and later joined the army. He fought in 1973 with
the Egyptian army against Israel.119 He led a successful coup against the country‟s
leadership in 1989 and he became the chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council
118
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for National Salvation which ruled the country. In 1991, he together with Hasan al
Turabi, a Muslim extremist and leader of the National Islamic Front (NIF) began to
Islamize the country and they introduced Islamic Shariah law in 1991. In October, 1993,
the Revolutionary Council was disbanded and al-Bashir was appointed president of
Sudan. In 2002, al-Bashir was elected President of Sudan and the war with the Sudanese
Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) continued to rage on. In 2003, rebel black African
groups in Darfur launched an attack on al-Bashir‟s government. To combat the uprising,
President al-Bashir enlisted the aid of the Arab militia known as the Janjaweed whose
brutal methods terrorized civilians, prevented international aid organizations from
delivering food and medical supplies and displaced more than two million people. In
response, the Security Council voted to send the case of Darfur to the ICC in 2005.
Although al-Bashir agreed to form a peace pact with the SPLA in 2005, the Prosecutor of
the ICC called for an arrest warrant against several leaders for crimes committed against
humanity, war crimes and genocide in Darfur.
The ICC Prosecutor later requested an arrest warrant against al-Bashir in 2008,
but the Sudanese government denied the charges. This was followed by the ICC
approving an arrest warrant in 2009 whose charges included war crimes and crimes
against humanity. In 2010, the ICC issued a second arrest warrant against al-Bashir
which also included genocide.

Conflict between Customary law and Articles of the Rome Statute
Although under customary international law, sitting heads of state have had
immunity from criminal prosecution before the domestic courts of foreign states; the new
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dynamics show that international law is changing. These new dynamics are evidenced in
Article 28 of the Rome Statute establishing the ICC which holds that neither the
immunity of a head of state nor the official position of a suspected international criminal
will bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction.120 Article 28 of the Rome Statute
seems to be in stark contrast with the traditional international legal position on immunity
which stipulates that a head of state has immunity, including among other things,
immunity from criminal and civil jurisdiction from arrest or prosecution from a foreign
state. Therefore, the issuance of an arrest warrant for President al-Bashir, a sitting head of
state will go down in history as it has set a new precedent. Did the Chamber erred in
issuing a sitting head of state with a warrant of arrest?

The position of the Chamber on the arrest warrant of President al-Bashir of Sudan
Zuzanne Bullock, in her article “Prosecuting President Al Bashir, and the short
Arm of Justice” explained the position that the Chamber unequivocally determined that
the traditionally sacrosanct concept of immunity of heads of state no longer applied
before an International Court or Tribunal. The Chamber also stated that as international
law currently stands, jurisdiction over non member states has to be derived from a higher
authority and that in the case of Sudan, higher authority exist by virtue of UNSC
Resolution 1593 which referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC. Moreover, this
resolution, according to Bullock, implies power to arrest and prosecute President alBashir. Hence, the reason why the UNSC passed Resolution 1593 in 2005 which
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referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC and urged all States, concerned regional
organization and other international organizations to cooperate fully with the Court. This
was followed by the Pre-Trial Chamber‟s decision on the Prosecution‟s application for a
warrant of arrest against al-Bashir and it asserted the ICC‟s jurisdiction over him despite
his position as the current head of state even though his country is not a party to the
Rome Statute. The Pre-Trial Chamber stated that Article (27)(1) and (2) provides that the
Rome Statute applies to all people equally regardless of their position and that the
capacity as a head of state did not exempt a person from criminal responsibility. All
parties were requested to cooperate with the Court in accordance with Article 89(1) and
91 of the Rome Statute for the arrest and surrender of al-Bashir.

Malawi’s position vis-à-vis’ Pre-Trial Chamber’s ruling on President al-Bashir
When the Republic of Malawi failed to comply with the ICC‟s ruling which urged
all states to comply with UNSC Resolution 1591, they claimed that their actions were in
line with the AU‟s position regarding al-Bashir‟s indictment and the dictates of Article
98(1) of the Rome Statute. In October 2011, the Republic of Malawi received President
al-Bashir on a state visit in spite of the fact that the position taken by the Government of
Malawi was in contradiction of UNSC‟s Resolution 1591. When the Republic of Malawi
was confronted by the Pre-Trial Chamber, the Republic of Malawi claimed that it was
acting within the African Union position on the matter which upheld the immunity of
serving heads of state not parties to the Rome Statute.121 In response, the Pre-Trial
Chamber stated that Article (19) (1) of the Rome Statute established the ultimate
121
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authority of the ICC to decide if immunities should be applied and respected in an
individual situation.122 The Chamber rejected Malawi‟s argument that al-Bashir was
immune from prosecution because he was a serving head of state and Sudan was a nonsignatory to the Rome Statute. The Chamber concluded that it was now a principle in
international law that immunity of either former or serving heads of state cannot be
invoked to oppose a prosecution by an international Court whether or not the states were
Party to the Rome Statute.

Nigeria's response to the Pre-Trial Chamber’s ruling on President al-Bashir
The Premium Times reported that the indicted al-Bashir visited the Republic of
Nigeria on July 14, 2013.123 This visit came after the heels of President al-Bashir visits to
Chad, Djibouti and Malawi respectively. As if the Pre-Trial Chamber's ruling was
nothing serious to go by, Nigeria, the powerhouse of the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS) defied the ICC ruling and went ahead to host al-Bashir with
the usual courtesies that are accorded to visiting heads of state.
In response to the outcry from rights activists to arrest al-Bashir, the Republic of
Nigeria stated that it was acting in line with the African Union's position which rejected
al-Bashir's arrest arguing that such an action will only serve to hamper peace efforts in
Sudan.

Is the Pre-Trial Chamber out of step with AU?
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While the Chamber admitted that there existed an inherent tension between
Articles 27(2) and 98(1) of the Rome Statute, the Chamber however maintained that
Malawi and the AU could not rely on Article 98(1) to justify non-cooperation. The
Chamber concluded that customary international law of immunities no longer applied
when an international court requested the arrest and surrender of a head of state wanted
for international crimes and that Article 98(1) in this instance did not apply.124 While
many scholars view the arrest warrant by the ICC following the UNSC resolution 1593 as
lawful, they argue that the request to state parties to arrest and surrender al Bashir is not
and that it is in contrary to Article 98(1) of the Rome Statute. The same critics ask
whether the Chamber‟s blanket assertion that immunity no longer applies before an
international criminal court would apply to leaders such as Obama or Bush. They feel
that this might never be the case given the power structure of the Security Council.
These observations might help to explain why the Africans are taking a resentful position
on the ICC as an institution.
While the Chamber‟s ruling clearly specifies that the AU and its member States
need to obey UNSC‟s resolutions without questioning the logic behind those rulings, the
AU‟s concerns on al-Bashir‟s indictment seems to be getting stronger by the day. Some
critics argue that the logic applied by the Chamber in its decision is partially flawed.
These critics argue that the effect of the decision by the Chamber renders customary
international law of immunities applying to current Heads of State obsolete. But that it
would also apply to Article 98 of the Rome Statute itself. For example, while Akande
observes that it is unfortunate that the Chamber ignores the fact that the Rome Statute is a
treaty instrument binding on only the signatories, he is also cognizant of the fact that by
124
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virtue of being a member of the United Nations, Sudan has also entrusted the Security
Council with the power to take any action it deems fit to maintain international peace and
security, including referral of the situation to an international court or tribunal. At the
same time, Akande is also of the view that by relying on the ICJ‟s opinion juris in the
arrest warrant cases and the judges‟ obiter dicta, immunity may not exist before
international criminal courts or tribunals. Such courts have jurisdiction established as a
general principle by the Chamber.125

Conclusion
While Sudan is a UNSC referral, cooperation on the implementation of the arrest
warrant of President al-Bashir has never been forthcoming. In fact, as a case that has set
some precedence in the history of the ICC, the situation in Sudan has created tension
between the Court and the African Union. While some scholars support the UNSC‟s
resolution 1593 that gave the Prosecutor power to issue al-Bashir‟s warrant of arrest, the
Chamber admits that there is tension between Articles 27(2) and 98(1) of the Rome
Statute. By looking at the progression of the al-Bashir case, it might be foolhardy to
suggest that the Sudan situation is likely to render the ICC effective.
The other point is that the Security Council, under the Rome Statute, has the
authority to grant a one-year, renewable moratorium on an arrest warrant, but has not
seen fit to so for both President Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir and President Uhuru
Migai Kenyatta.
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CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

The thesis examines the effectiveness of the International Criminal Court. The
hypothesis of the thesis is that, even though the ICC was created as a politically
independent institution to prosecute the most serious international crimes of genocide,
war crimes and crimes against humanity, the Court's effectiveness is largely dependent on
the initiating entities. While the initiating entities are: states parties, the Prosecutor and
the Security Council, there is need for cooperation among these entities if the Court's
effectiveness is to be achieved.
In order to establish whether the claim of the hypothesis has been proven, all
cases that were referred to the Court since July 1, 2002 when the Rome Statute came into
force were examined. Since the cases that the thesis has dealt with are divided into two
broad categories namely, general cases and in-depth case studies, the results of each case
have helped to show who the initiating entity has been. The results of each case also
show whether the Court had been effective or not. Interestingly, regarding the six cases,
each initiating entity has referred two cases to the Court.
The following components were used to measure the effectiveness on the Court: i) was
the Court able to arrest the person and bring them to the ICC for trial, ii) was the Court
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able to collect the needed evidence for trial and iii) whether adequate access to witnesses
to appear in Court or give testimony for the trial had been secured. Effectiveness is high
where all three components have been established by the Court. Effectiveness is low
when only two of the components have taken place, and lowest when only one or none of
the components was activated.
In order to establish whether the initiating entity cooperated with other parties to
the Rome Statute such that the Court was rendered effective, cases were analyzed to see
if they met the threshold that was used to measure effectiveness.

Security Council referrals – Libya and Darfur/Sudan
As UNSC referrals, the situation in both Libya and Darfur/Sudan are currently in
stalemate. Even though the UNSC followed all the procedures to indict President alBashir, not only is Sudan refusing to cooperate with the UNSC, the African Union is also
refusing to comply with the requirements of the Chamber. However, the thesis has also
shown in both cases that, no arrest has been made, and that in the case of Sudan, no data
has been made available to show that the Court had collected sufficient evidence for trial
or that there is adequate access to witnesses to appear in Court.

The Prosecutor proprio motu initiated cases – Cote d'Ivoire and Kenya
In the Cote d'Ivoire case, the Court has partially reached the threshold for
effectiveness. Former President Laurent Gbagbo is in custody in The Hague awaiting
trial. While the thesis has not established whether the Court has managed to have
adequate access to witnesses to appear in Court, what has established is that the Ivorian
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authorities filed a declaration under Article 12 of the ICC Statute which might mean that
needed evidence for trial may be available. On the Kenyan case, President Uhuru
Kenyata's arrest is pending. Even though the Prosecutor followed proper procedures that
led to the indictment of Kenyata, the effectiveness of the Court has not been established
yet. Even though the Kenyan Waki Commission named alleged perpetrators of the
Kenyan 2007 post-election violence, the majorities of witnesses have either died or have
withdrawn from the case, and the perpetrators have not been arrested or brought to the
Court.

State party referral – The Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda
The DRC and Ugandan situations were both state referrals. The Ugandan case
involves Joseph Kony who is still at large. Even though the case is still pending, there
are many issues that are raised inside and outside the country concerning Uganda's
referral to the ICC. The issues range from the question of admissibility, impartiality,
amnesty, accountability and reconciliation. Until Kony is found, nothing will happen.
The DRC situation is the classic example of the effectiveness of the ICC. After the DRC
government referred the situation in the Ituri region to the ICC, the Prosecutor requested
an ICC arrest warrant which was granted by the Chamber. The warrant was issued and
the DRC arrested and handed Lubanga to the ICC. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo was
convicted in The Hague on 14 March, 2012 for the enlistment and conscription of
children under 15 years in his army, the FPLC and the judges ultimately sentenced him to
14 years.
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This thesis had set out to explore the effectiveness of the International Criminal Court.
And, what the thesis has proven is that the effectiveness of the Court is dependent on the
initiating entity. The DRC situation is a classic example of a conviction resulting from a
state referral that has proven that effectiveness of the Court is possible when cooperation
is high among parties to the Rome Statute.
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